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NOT “BY ALL MEANS NECESSARY”: A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK
FOR POST-9/11 APPROACHES TO COUNTERTERRORISM
Amos N. Guiora*
Counterterrorism significantly benefits from a comparativist approach.
Precisely because no one country has the monopoly on effective operational
measures, nation states significantly benefit from analyzing measures applied by other states confronting similar dilemmas and challenges subject to
the role of law. To that end, this article examines the policies of targeted
killing and administrative detention as applied in Israel and asks whether
and how they are applicable to American counterterrorism. In asking this
question, it is important to determine whether the two policies are relevant
to the U.S. legal framework. An important consideration is how the differences between Israeli and American societies, geographies, constitutions,
and strategies condition the counterterrorism policy of each country. As a
result of such differences, what works in one country may not work in
another. While I am an unequivocal advocate for comparative research and
analysis and have sought to bring this approach to my scholarship, I am
fully aware of its limitations. That said, I firmly believe that nation states
can and must learn from each other. While judicial, constitutional, and societal paradigms are unique and distinct, like-minded civil, democratic
states must undertake the critical effort to understand how similar countries
address similar issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Obama Administration faces the difficult challenge of developing operational counterterrorism models while confronting determined foes
on multiple fronts. Doing so requires the Administration to balance the legitimate rights of the individual with the equally legitimate national security
rights of the state. In particular, the Obama Administration faces two critical
questions (with which the Bush Administration similarly—and unsuccessfully—struggled): (1) creating and implementing a legal and effective detention paradigm for post 9/11 detainees; and (2) articulating the conditions
for authorizing a targeting killing. This article will examine both policies—
detention and targeted killing—using a comparative approach.
*
Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, the University of Utah; I would like to
thank Lena Cetvei (J.D. expected 2011, S.J. Quinney College of Law, the University of
Utah) for invaluable editorial assistance.
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Specifically, I will examine both policies through the lens of the
Israeli experience. This is not to suggest that the Israeli approach is correct
or foolproof. Rather, when treading in these difficult waters, it is important
to recognize that learning from others is essential to developing a lawful and
effective counterterrorism policy. In addition, I will address—and propose
the pursuit of—active judicial review in an effort to ensure checks and balances and separation of powers. Justice Jackson’s words regarding an unfettered executive ring as loudly today as they did fifty years ago. 1
Section II will focus on administrative detention—both options for
future models and lessons from the Israeli experience. In section III, I offer
brief comments on targeted killing. Section IV will address the importance
of judicial review in the framework of administrative detention and counterterrorism and section V will offer a perspective on comparativism.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
This discussion addresses current detainees and those who will be
detained in the days and years ahead. My fundamental assumption is that
the U.S. must replace the existing post 9/11 detention model—frankly, “indefinite detention”—with a paradigm consistent with U.S. constitutional
protections and habeas corpus guarantees as the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush2 and Judge Bates 3 have articulated.
To do so, the Obama Administration must examine and ultimately
resolve several fundamental issues regarding detainees arrested since 9/11
and presently held in Guantánamo Bay, Bagram, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere by or on behalf of the U.S.:
(1) Will the post 9/11 paradigm be defined as a traditional criminal
law or war paradigm or as a hybrid combining aspects of both?
(2) What are the criteria for determining whether a specific detainee
poses a particular threat to U.S national security?
(3) What are the standards for judicial review for detainees deemed to
pose a threat, after the establishment of a criteria-based vetting
process?
(4) Are all detainees prosecutable or will some be held in an alternate
detention paradigm?
(5) Will released detainees be freed to their country of citizenship, in
the U.S. or to some third country, and how will this be determined?

1
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
2
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
3
See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 208–09 (D.D.C. 2009).
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For detainees arrested and held in the future, I advocate a model
based on the criminal law system but modified to reflect the differences
between terrorism and what is understood to be the traditional criminal law
paradigm. In a nutshell, I define terrorism as actions seeking to advance a
cause (religious, social, political, or economic) by killing or injuring innocent civilians or intimidating the civilian population from conducting its
normal activities with no pecuniary benefit accrued to the terrorist. In addition, as I have suggested elsewhere, prosecuting accused terrorists often
requires the introduction of classified intelligence information. 4 For this
reason, I have previously proposed a hybrid model as an alternative judicial
paradigm, often called a national security court. 5
With respect to detention, I propose adoption of a two-tiered model.
If the arrest is based on criminal evidence, detention prior to trial in the traditional criminal law paradigm is appropriate. If, however, the arrest is
based on classified intelligence information regarding involvement in terrorist acts, administrative detention should be appropriate. My recommendation for the adoption of an administrative detention model in the U.S. is
based on the following considerations:
(1) A determination that a detainee presents a specific threat to national security;
(2) An assessment of the reliability and credibility of the intelligence
information;
(3) Active and independent judicial review;
(4) Source protection subject to independent judicial review, a legitimate consideration in when intelligence information suggests that the
prospective detainee is involved in future acts of terrorism.

The process and considerations of applying administrative detention
on specific individuals has developed over the course of many years in
Israel. 6 The measure is applied in the West Bank by order of the military
commander (Israel has never annexed the West Bank) and in Israel by the
Minister of Defense. 7 In both, the decision is subject to judicial review: in
the West Bank by two military courts and the Israeli Supreme Court, and in
Israel by the Tel Aviv District Court and by the Israeli Supreme Court.

4

Amos N. Guiora, Military Commissions and National Security Courts After Guantánamo, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 199, 202–03 (2008).
5
See id. at 204–05.
6
Emanuel Gross, Human Rights, Terrorism and the Problem of Administrative Detention
in Israel: Does a Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining Chips? 18
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 721, 752–61 (2001).
7
See British Government, The Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1442 PALESTINE
GAZETTE 1055 (Sept. 27, 1945).

276

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 42:273

The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice
(HCJ), held administrative detention to be lawful in accordance with Clause
85 of the Defense Emergency Regulation Act of 1945, provided that the
available intelligence information indicates that the individual in question is
involved in a future act of terrorism. Furthermore, the evidence must meet a
six part test of reliability, credibility, validity, viability, time-relevance, and
the inability to be presented in open court because of the over-arching requirement to protect an intelligence source. An order for administrative detention is subject to three layers of judicial review: first, a hearing before a
military judge, akin to an administrative hearing; second, an appeal before a
senior military judge; and finally a hearing before the Israeli Supreme Court
(sitting as the HCJ). According to the Defense Emergency Regulation Act,
an order may authorize detention for a maximum period of six months, with
the opportunity to renew for an additional six months. Although an order
may be renewed an unlimited number of times, each renewal order requires
the same three-step judicial process.
The fundamental premise of the administrative detention model is
the individual’s involvement in a future act. That involvement must present
a sufficiently real—not just perceived—threat to national security in order
to justify a process in which neither the individual nor counsel see the classified information; 8 judicial hearings are held in camera/ex parte. 9 Human
rights organizations have been extremely critical of the denial of the right to
confront one’s accuser. However, the HCJ has upheld the denial of this right
as lawful and necessary in the context of national security, based on a demonstration that the commander (who signs the order) has weighed, balanced,
and considered the following:
(1) The quality of the intelligence and the reliability of the source;
(2) The possibility that the intelligence cannot be declassified (which
would enable initiation of the criminal law process);
(3) The threat the individual poses to national security;
(4) The appropriate length of detention in proportion to the threat
posed;
(5) For renewal of orders based on information that justified the initial order, as opposed to new information, the continuing severity and
nature of the threat, among other factors.

In practice, when the Israel Security Agency (ISA) receives intelligence information suggesting a specific individual’s involvement in terrorism, there are several options “on the table”: arrest for the purpose of inter8

See CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. State of Israel [2008] 20–22 (Isr.), translation available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04.pdf.
9
Id.
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rogation and trial, administrative detention, or monitoring and surveillance
without detention.
If the ISA recommends administrative detention, the military commander will ask his legal advisor to review the intelligence information in
order to advise whether to adopt the recommendation. In my postings as
senior security advisor to the West Bank Legal Advisor (1990–1992) and
Gaza Strip Legal Advisor (1994–1997), I regularly reviewed ISA recommendations to military commanders regarding Palestinian residents of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. My recommendations were either to accept the
ISA’s detention recommendation, including the length of the detention, or
to reject the ISA’s recommendation and advise the commander either to not
detain the individual or to arrest him and initiate a criminal law process.
In each case, I based my recommendations to the commander on the
following specific considerations:
(1) Quality of intelligence and source reliability (this required an expert opinion from an ISA official);
(2) Timeliness of the intelligence information (this required an expert
opinion from an ISA case agent);
(3) An individual’s previous activities (this required review of the ISA
intelligence dossier);
(4) Impact of detention on the individual’s immediate community;
which is particularly relevant if the individual was a highly regarded
or a respected leader (this required an expert opinion from an ISA
official);
(5) NGO response to the particular detention (Israeli and international
human rights organizations were unanimous in their criticism of the
administrative detention measure; in addition, we faced additional
sensitivity with respect to certain categories including women,
“people of prominence,” and attorneys);
(6) Severity of the danger the individual posed (this required an expert
opinion from an ISA official);
(7) Possibility for declassification of the intelligence information and
for the interrogation of the individual, thus enabling initiation of the
criminal law process;
(8) Danger to the source were the information to be declassified (this
required an expert opinion from an ISA official);
(9) Likelihood that the Israel Supreme Court (sitting as the HCJ)
would intervene in the commander’s decision.

If I affirmed the ISA’s recommendation, the intelligence dossier
and my recommendations went to the commander. If the commander accepted my recommendation, the individual would be detained in accordance
with the signed order, which included a short description of the order’s justification, largely a general statement regarding the individual’s activity. As
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I shall discuss later, these orders are subject to judicial review by the military court and Israel Supreme Court. 10
Administrative detention is “necessary and vital” for national security. However, the legal, moral, and policy dilemmas pose significant questions that demand attention. Two fundamental realities are particularly
troublesome. First, the detainee cannot confront his accuser and therefore
fails to enjoy a fundamental right guaranteed in the criminal law paradigm.
Second, the individual is detained—predicated on intelligence information
exclusively—prior to carrying out what is believed to be a future act of terrorism. Balancing these two realities is essential to the lawful implementation of an administrative detention measure; by its very nature the administrative detention places the individual at an extraordinary disadvantage.
When I was asked to review a file—whether as legal advisor or judge—the
dilemma was the same: is the measure truly necessary or is there another
available mechanism that balances the legitimate rights of the individual
with the equally legitimate rights of the state? While the preferred answer—
provided I was convinced of the danger posed by the individual—was to
initiate the criminal law process, operational counterterrorism’s reliance on
intelligence information often forecloses this option. In a nutshell, protecting the source is of the fundamental essence, because otherwise the state
cannot gather the intelligence information that is the heart and soul of operational counterterrorism.
That said, it is important to recall the criteria for applying administrative detention: individuals who were involved to varying degrees in planning future acts of terrorism or had indicated their intention to commit future acts. In planning with others, the individual—by analogy—was engaged in a conspiracy; for example, by indicating to others an intention to
throw Molotov cocktails the next time a Israel Defense Force (IDF) patrol
passed through his village, the individual clearly expressed an intent to
commit a crime. Administrative detention is preventive detention. In this
situation, the ISA would recommend administratively detaining the individual. My decision (and this is critical to the discussion) would be based—in
large part—on the two factors addressed earlier: reliability and relevance of
the intelligence information and whether the information could be
declassified.
By analogy, if terrorism depends on resources and motivation, then
counterterrorism depends on intelligence information based on sources. My
dilemma, then, was whether the severity of the planned action justified denying the individual his day in court in order to protect the source. As a
lawyer trained to respect the principle of enabling the accused to confront
his accuser, I consistently grappled with that issue. In many ways the di10

See infra Part IV.
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lemma is “lose-lose”; the denial of otherwise-guaranteed privileges and
protections raises fundamental legal and moral questions regarding society
and the limits to which it will go to protect itself. I have, throughout my
career, recoiled at phrases such as “by all means necessary.” I have always
believed that a seat at the counterterrorism table, which I had, brings with it
the requirement of understanding the limits of power. That is, one must be
extraordinarily sensitive to both the rule of law and the dangers inherent in
the slippery slope—as exemplified by government excess not subject to
independent judicial review.
As the legal advisor tasked with recommending to the commander
whether and for how long to administratively detain a Palestinian resident of
either the West Bank or Gaza Strip, I viewed it as my responsibility to be a
buffer between competing interests. On the one hand, the security agency
had very specific interests that generally aligned with the commander’s; on
the other hand, the potential detainee had rights and freedom that were also
deserving of protection. While the courts (both military and Israeli Supreme
Court sitting as the HCJ) exercised independent review of each detention
order, both with respect to necessity and length of detention, I endeavored
to minimize the cases in which the HCJ would intervene in the commander’s decision. To that end, my responsibility was to review the intelligence
information carefully to ensure that only cases in which administrative detention was required were brought before the commander. The two step
process—(1) whether to detain; and (2) if yes, for what period of time—
required the balancing of powerful and competing interests.
I have repeatedly argued that the most difficult part of the process
was determining what detention period to recommend to the commander. I
found this decision more difficult than sentencing a defendant represented
by counsel, precisely because the detainee did not have the right to confront
his accuser. It would be fair to state that determinations regarding how
many months in detention were appropriate for a given individual represent
some of my most difficult internal struggles. While a mathematical formula
does not exist, I used the principles of proportionality and necessity as a
guide to balancing equally legitimate rights, coupled with the understanding, frankly, that the process is inherently problematic because the detainee
cannot confront his accuser.
I have advocated elsewhere for the creation of an alternative judicial paradigm for bringing post 9/11 detainees to trial. 11 That same court
would also be the most appropriate forum for administrative detention. The
alternative paradigm is fundamentally predicated on the understanding that
terrorist trials often require the introduction of classified information. This
would be particularly true should the U.S. decide to bring detainees held for
11

See Guiora, supra note 4.
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a number of years in Guantánamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and Bagram to trial.
Both trials of suspected terrorists and administrative detention hearings involve review of intelligence information. I would therefore suggest that the
proposed alternative judicial model is appropriate for both paradigms. Critics have, correctly, identified the fundamental flaw in the proposal: the alternative paradigm denies the individual the right to confront some or all of
his accusers. 12
That criticism is both valid and correct. However, the unfortunate
reality of operational counterterrorism is a reliance on classified intelligence
information. An alternative judicial paradigm (whether trial or administrative detention) seeks to strike a balance by guaranteeing process through
judicial review rather than allowing detention by executive fiat not subject
to independent judicial review. The latter model is clearly unconstitutional
and has, in large part, been struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court. 13 The
question going forward is what process should the Obama Administration
establish for the thousands of detainees presently held? I would suggest that
the proposed administrative detention model in conjunction with the alternative judicial model reflects a balanced approach in an extraordinarily complicated and complex paradigm.
III. TARGETED KILLINGS
Israel’s policies on administrative detention and judicial review
provide useful frameworks for assessing options for a U.S. model. In light
of the recent revelations regarding CIA plans to conduct secret targeted killings of al-Qaeda operatives, Israel’s targeted killing policy may prove helpful. As I suggested in a Foreign Policy article, License to Kill, these revelations are sure to set off a renewed debate in the U.S. over the legality, utility, and morality of killing terrorists. 14 In the article, I wrote:
Targeted killings are indeed legal, under certain conditions. The decision
to use targeted killing of terrorists is based on an expansive articulation of
the concept of pre-emptive self-defense, intelligence information, and an
analysis regarding policy effectiveness. According to Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, a nation state can respond to an armed attack. Targeted killing, however, is somewhat different because the state acts before the attack
occurs. In addition to self-defense principles, the four critical principles of
12

See, e.g., Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects:
Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 593, 643
(2009).
13
See, e.g., Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004);
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
14
Amos N. Guiora, License to Kill, FOREIGN POL’Y, July 13, 2009, available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/13/licence_to_kill?page=full.
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international law—alternatives, military necessity, proportionality, and
collateral damage—are critical to the decision-maker’s analysis.
The basis for the attack is intelligence information that meets a four-part
test: Is it reliable, credible, valid, and viable? Given the stakes, corroborated information is significantly preferable to information that comes
from a single source.
Israel instituted its targeted killing policy in large part in response to Palestinian suicide-bombing attacks. But it’s not just the bombers themselves
that are a threat. Four actors—the bomber, the planner, the driver/logistics
person, and the financier—form the basis of the suicide bombing infrastructure. Determining which of the four is a legitimate target, and when,
is the critical question decision-makers face. As not all four are legitimate
targets at all times, the commander is limited against whom he can act;
that reality reflects the limits of self-defense.
This rearticulation of expansive self-defense is insufficient on its own,
however, because the decision to authorize the “hit” is not made in a vacuum. Implementing the four international law principles referenced above
requires the commander to ascertain that the “hit” is essential to national
security and therefore proportional to the risk the individual presents. Furthermore, the commander must determine that any alternatives, such as
capturing and detaining the individual, are not operationally possible. The
commander must also seek to minimize the collateral damage—harm to
innocent civilians—that is all but inevitable in such attacks.
When asked by a particular commander to authorize a targeted killing, I
would ask the following factual questions:
a. Who is the source?
b. How reliable is the source?
c. How timely is the information?
d. What is the relationship between the source and the potential
target?
e. How precise is the information? (I was once told, for example,
“he is wearing a blue shirt and blue jeans,” but it was nighttime and
the commander had night-vision equipment)
f. When was the last time the unit conducted a nighttime ambush?
g. How confident was the commander in his unit’s capabilities?
h. Did the commander receive the intelligence directly from the intelligence community and had he discussed the issue with a case
officer?
Although I have advocated the effectiveness of targeted killings from an
operational counterterrorism perspective and supported its legality as an
expansive articulation of self-defense, in the case of the blue jeans I did
not authorize the requested attack. The information about the individual
unequivocally indicated that the danger posed to Israeli national security
was palpable. I was also convinced that detaining him was operationally
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unfeasible. However—and this is the core of the issue—I was not convinced that the individual in the commander’s scope was the right man.
Aggressive operational counterterrorism is lawful, but that is not enough.
It must also be effective and moral. Understanding and implementing the
limits of power is an essential aspect of aggressive self-defense; uncertainty is a fact of life in the counterterrorism business. Precisely for that reason, the four pillars of counterterrorism must include the applicable law,
but also morality, policy effectiveness, and careful and cautious operational decisions.
Targeted killings decisions are among the most complicated and complex
aspects of operational counterterrorism. The decision-maker literally faces
an overwhelming amount of information. Before authorizing and firing,
the commander must ascertain who the target is; otherwise, the policy is illegal, ineffective, and immoral. But if you’re sure you’ve got the right guy,
and you have no other viable options, fire away. The nation’s safety may
15
depend on it.

IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Once any counterterrorism policy or operation is implemented,
judicial review becomes paramount. After all, the limits of power are essential to the rule of law. While, perhaps, this is an obvious motto or slogan, its
application in times of crisis is no mean feat. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision to intern Japanese-Americans in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Korematsu v. United States 16 are clear examples of what I define as panic responses. The Palmer Raids, Prize Cases and
the Presidential Order establishing the Military Commissions are similar
examples. 17 What is disheartening in all four is that while the executive
engaged in excess, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court engaged or
challenged the President. Checks and balances fell by the wayside; Justice
Jackson’s famous warning of an unfettered executive 18 went unheeded.
As the three branches of government move into the post-Bush era,
they would do well to recall not only Justice Jackson’s words but also those
of the former President (Chief Justice) of the Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon
Barak: “‘Security considerations’ are not magic words.” 19 These two articu15

Id.
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
17
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863); Military Order of November 13, 2001:
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3
C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. IV 2004).
18
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
19
Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court and the Problem of Terrorism, in JUDGMENTS OF THE
ISRAEL SUPREME COURT : FIGHTING TERRORISM WITHIN THE LAW 19 (2005).
16
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lations of the same concept are essential to understanding how judicial review is critical to the implementation of counterterrorism policies.
The fundamental requirements for such policies, including administrative detention and targeted killings, are caution and skepticism; caution
by the executive and skepticism by Congress and the courts. Both are essential to the rule of law and ensuring that “by all means necessary” will be
relegated to Hollywood rather than adopted by the Administration as a viable counterterrorism policy. As a direct participant in decision-making in
the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack, I know it is easier said than
done. The decision-maker is truly put to the test: the public and media are
clamoring for a response and politicians in opposition parties demand action
to assure voters that if they were in office either the attack would not have
occurred or their response would be so powerful and effective as to literally
guarantee no future attacks. Precisely because of these pressures, the Supreme Court must engage in active judicial review.
The administrative detention paradigm, with its inherent prejudice
against the detainee, requires rigorous judicial review, perhaps more than
other operational counterterrorism measures. When recommending to commanders whether to administratively detain Palestinians, I considered the
HCJ’s future review of the recommendation to be a critical component of
my decision-making process. After all, the court would often ask why a
particular recommendation was made and would intervene if it was not convinced that the decision met a reasonableness standard. While reasonableness may seem broad, it was sufficiently contoured to provide decisionmakers guidelines regarding the range of what measures could be implemented. Active judicial review of administrative detention orders means
that the court is consistently examining whether the executive correctly applies the reasonableness test to operational decisions. That is, the review is
not vague; rather, it is concrete because the court wants to be satisfied that
the executive understands that reasonableness is not an abstract concept, but
rather has clear parameters and judicially imposed limits.
In Israel, judicial review is used not only to check the actions of
commanders in implementing administrative detention against an individual, but at all levels of executive power. For example, in my recent article in
the Jurist, Judicial Review and the Executive: Lessons from Israel, 20 I addressed a case in which the HCJ held that the IDF’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps decision to not order a court martial for a commander was not
reasonable. 21 In that article I wrote:

20

Amos Guiora, Judicial Review and the Executive: Lessons from Israel, JURIST, July 13,
2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/07/judicial-review-and-executive-lessons.php.
21
Abu Rahma v. Judge Advocate General 08/7195 [2004] (Isr.).
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The executive, regardless of rank and post, is not immune from
judicial review. Deference does not benefit the state or the individual
petitioner. If the Israeli Supreme Court had taken the track of
judicial deference, in all probability the JAG’s decision would have been
upheld, thereby minimizing the gravity of the commander’s
decision. Only by directly engaging the executive in active strict scrutiny
could the Court hold that the JAG had fundamentally erred.
Nothing is more dangerous to a democracy than an “unfettered executive”.
Justice Jackson was both prescient and correct in Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Co. v. Sawyer. His concern was also timeless. This principle must be
applied across the board. Encouraging judicial review of some executive
branches but not others will do no more than ensure unequal justice
under law. The JAG’s decision must be subject to review in the same
vein as that of any other executive decision maker. The essence of active
judicial review is to protect the unprotected and to ensure that the
executive acts within reasonable boundaries as broadly defined.
By ruling that the JAG did not act within these boundaries, the Court is
sending a loud and clear message: the executive is subject to strict judicial
review and it cannot hide behind the cloak of executive decision making.
That powerful and compelling message should be adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, particularly when striking a balance between the legitimate
rights of the individual and the equally legitimate national security rights
of the State. The free pass that the Supreme Court has historically granted
the executive in national security cases (Korematsu v. United States being
the poster child) has, in the long-run, harmed the individual and the state
22
alike.

In his book, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in War Time, 23
the Late Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated that “reticence” should be the
Supreme Court’s role in times of armed conflict; in contrast, Barak’s model
was a fundamental lack of deference to the executive (IDF). 24 Although IDF
commanders felt the HCJ intervened in their natural bailiwick, Barak was
convinced of the need to ensure that operational counterterrorism measures
were reasonable. The only way to do so was to engage the executive
through judicial review, because without it judicial deference would create
an inevitable disregard for the rule of law.

22

Guiora, supra note 20.
See WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE : CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 225
(1998).
24
See Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, Going Toe to Toe: President Barak’s and Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s Theories of Judicial Activism, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51,
54–56 (2006).
23

2009]

NOT “BY ALL MEANS NECESSARY”

285

V. COMPARATIVISM IN PERSPECTIVE
In determining if and how the various Israeli policies of administrative detention, targeted killings, and judicial review can be useful in creating
the U.S. legal framework, an important consideration is how the differences
between Israeli and American societies, geographies, constitutions, and
strategies condition the counterterrorism policy of each country. As a result
of such differences, what works in one country may not work in another. 25
While I am an unequivocal advocate for comparative research and
analysis and have sought to bring this approach to my scholarship, I am
fully aware of its limitations. That said, I firmly believe that nation states
can and must learn from each other. While judicial, constitutional, and societal paradigms are unique and distinct, like-minded civil, democratic
states must undertake the critical effort to understand how similar countries
address similar issues. In the field of counterterrorism (like others), no single nation state has “all the answers,” making learning from others essential.
Under former President (Chief Justice) Meir Shamgar, and particularly under former President (Chief Justice) Aharon Barak, the Israeli Supreme Court was the nation’s dominant institution, matched—perhaps—
only by the IDF. Barak’s extraordinarily broad definition of standing and
justiciability meant that literally every alleged grievance committed by the
State (including future proposed action) was petitionable to the Court sitting
as the HCJ. As discussed above, beginning in the nineteen nineties, military
commanders were increasingly forced to take into consideration the Court’s
real-time intervention. The dilemma of the decision-maker—complicated
enough in operational counterterrorism without external intervention—was
indeed made more complicated precisely because the Court imposed its
“reasonableness” test on commanders. 26 The burden was on the commander
to show that a particular operational decision met that test; if not, the Court
would not hesitate to rule that the commander’s decision violated the rights
of the petitioner.
I have advocated in my scholarship the absolute importance of active judicial review. 27 The basis for this deeply held belief is the seat that I
had at the counterterrorism table. That is, I have been a direct participant
(not witness) to extraordinarily complicated dilemmas and understand the
tension between excess of power and limits of power. That tension and the
25
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need to respond justify active judicial review. The legislative branches in
any country, including the U.S. and Israel—as historically documented—are
either incapable of or unwilling to restrain the executive. Therefore, the only
operational response to Justice Jackson’s unfettered executive concern is an
active, interventionist Court.
However, the Israeli paradigm is not a mirror image of the American paradigm. Barak’s theory of an unlimited scope of judicial review
stands in direct contrast to the “cases and controversies” clause of Article III
of the U.S. Constitution. 28 As a result of Chief Justice Marshall’s decision
in Marbury v. Madison, 29 the Supreme Court became an equal partner in the
government. In the Israeli paradigm according to Barak’s theory, I suggest
that the Court (particularly when sitting as the HCJ) is first among equals.
Is this system translatable into the U.S. paradigm? According to
Marbury and a narrow reading of “cases and controversies,” the majority of
scholars would suggest it is not. On the other hand, the historical U.S. overreaction to perceived or actual threats suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court
(in the absence of a Congress that genuinely engages in “checks and balances”) could adopt a fundamentally different approach than it has historically. Perhaps Boumediene30 and Hamlily 31 are a sign of things to come;
needless to say, I fully agree with Judge John Bates and only hope that future decisions will reflect his holding. 32
It is clear that there are fundamental differences between Israel and
America—size and immediacy of the threat are but prime examples. However, precisely because both are vibrant democracies the principles of
checks and balances and separation of powers must be more than empty
platitudes. They are what protect us from executive excess in both cultures.
The role of the Court is to constantly and unblinkingly engage the executive. Whether Barak’s theory is too interventionist is a matter of lively academic debate; while I would suggest it was a proper response in reining in
the executive, I well understand those who are critical. On the other hand,
former Chief Justice Rehnquist’s theory regarding the role of the Court in
times of armed conflict is, I respectfully suggest, deeply flawed and ultimately harmful to U.S. principles and values.
The ultimate role, I believe, of a “comparativist” is to examine different regimes—recognizing that profound differences exist—with the intention of identifying strengths from distinct paradigms and cobbling to28
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gether a functional model for addressing similar issues. With respect to
counterterrorism, the Israeli model (albeit problematic as I have argued) is
adaptable in the U.S., if based on legislation and subject to active judicial
review.

